PSD Blog - The World Bank Group

Weekend Reading

Regulatory failure, special interests, and financial sector lobbying: European Union edition.

Negative interest rates on T-bills: This time is different.

"The fact that oil is trading at $80 a barrel in this climate should tell you that it is trading more as a financial asset than on supply/demand imbalances".

California is doing its part in the fight against deflation, one university at a time.

The recession is having quite an impact on migration trends in the United States. Plus, our People Move blog looks at new remittance data.

Tyler Cowen describes these two posts from Paul Krugman and Brad Delong as "critically important stuff and two of the best recent economics blog posts, in some time."

War is brewing in the financial blogosphere.

Matthew Yglesias thinks that Chinese leverage over the US is overblown.

More emerging market attempts to stop the appreciation of their currencies.

Finally, as the US gets ready for the Thanksgiving holiday, Adam Gopnik analyzes our hunger for cookbooks.

Today in Capital Controls

Yesterday I suggested that emerging market economies, rather than the United States, were better poised to criticize China's currency policy. It looks like, rather than criticizing China's policy, many are simply trying replicate it. Brazil and Taiwan are leading the way:

Asian currencies came under pressure on Thursday as a move from Brazil to further curb foreign inflows sparked fears that other countries would follow suit. Brazil moved overnight to close a loophole that had allowed investors to avoid a 2 per cent tax on foreign investment in equities and bonds announced last month.

Speculative flows have now reached the point where many emerging market currencies have hit levels that threaten to undermine their export sectors.

So far most emerging market economies have managed the problem by intervening in currency markets to slow the appreciation of their currencies. However, Brazil and Taiwan have taken more dramatic action, imposing capital controls designed to limit the appreciation of their currencies.

Speculation has risen that other countries will follow their lead.

“Recent measures from Brazil and Taiwan curbing capital inflows send a clear signal: emerging market policymakers are far away from accepting a sustained reallocation of portfolio capital from the west, and its liquidity and currency implications,” said David Bloom at HSBC.

Taiwan's decision to ban foreigners from putting money into time deposits seems to be working. Investors have pulled out roughly 12 percent of this 'hot' money. Taiwan's success, and Brazil's apparent determination, are likely to encourage others to take a more assertive stance.

Low interest rates in the West, coupled with a fixed renminbi and weaker dollar, have left many emerging markets somewhere between a rock and a hard place. They now must try to avoid excessive currency appreciation without appearing hostile to the foreign investment that is fueling much of their growth.

The global economy is unlikely to reach any sort of equilibrium for a very long time.

Is the US the appropriate renminbi critic?

Free Exchange has observed over the past few days that the blogosphere, financial press, and political punditry have put forth a plethora of opinions about Chinese economic policy. Let's take a look at some of the latest:

Bill Owens argues for closer cooperation in just about everything:

The US-China relationship is a vital interest for the two countries and the world. Throughout history, great powers have tended to become adversaries. Now, for a few years, we have a chance to break that cycle. It will take strong and enduring commitment on both sides. But a new and engaging relationship is imperative for our common good

Martin Wolf puts wishful words into the mouth of Barack Obama:

At a time of such weak global demand, yours is a 'beggar thy neighbor' policy. You complain about the protectionist actions I have implemented. But their impact will be trivial compared with China's 'exchange rate protectionism'. This policy will shift the costs of adjustment on to China's trading partners.

The Lure of Local Bonds

IFC announced yesterday that it will issue a $43m local currency bond in Central Africa, a first for the World Bank institution, and also a first for a non-local financial institution. This is IFC's second local currency bond in Sub-Saharan Africa, following its issuance of a West African Kola Bond in late 2006:

The 20 billion Central African francs ($43 million equivalent), five-year tenor bond will be listed on the regional exchange in Libreville and on the Doula Stock Exchange. It will be tax-exempt in all six countries in the Economic and Monetary Community of the Central African zone. The countries are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. All proceeds will be reinvested in the zone.

IFC's timing is quite prescient. As the recovery from the crisis continues to be lopsided, strongly favoring emerging markets, there should be substantial outside investor interest in these types local-currency bonds (see previous post).

Furthermore, increased dollar volatility will enhance the attractiveness of local currency bonds in two ways. First, judging by the market's negative reaction to Ben Bernanke's dollar reassurances, foreign investors should be more willing to take on local currency risk, as they remain convinced that dollar depreciation will continue for some time.

Second, while foreign investors seem sanguine about the dollar's weakness, local investors from fragile emerging markets, such as those in Central Africa, are more likely to recall the dollar's upside potential. Should another crisis occur, triggering a flight to safety along the lines of what we saw in the aftermath of last year's crisis, emerging market currencies will be the first to fall. Local currency bonds offer a layer of insurance against the damage that such a precipitous outflow of capital can cause, making them an attractive option for local businesses and investors alike. 

Weekend Reading: Unemployment Edition

Can development workers win wars?

Is transport infrastructure the most important aspect of urban evolution?

The Treasury's courtship of the blogosphere.

Is China's changing worldview bad for business?

America's largest retailer: it's not Wal-Mart.

Why are some marathons more volatile than others?

The EU's role in reducing state fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Thoughts on migration: Kosovo edition.

Unemployment

What America can learn from Europe about unemployment.

Other difficulties that arise from high unemployment.

Plus, unemployment charts galore from Calculated Risk.

A less pessimistic take on today's numbers (it's still ugly).

Why employment is down and GDP up? It's all about productivity.

A Chinese Marshall Plan?

Geoff Dyer explores the idea of using China's massive foreign exchange reserves to form an investment vehicle for emerging markets. He has assembled a series of proposals from leading Chinese thinkers, including some from within the government.

For example:

• Hu Xiaolian, deputy governor of the central bank, has proposed the idea of a "supra-sovereign wealth investment fund" which would invest in developing countries so that "these countries (can) serve as new engines in global recovery and growth."
• World Bank Chief Economist Justin Lin thinks that "Chinese companies should step up investment in Africa and south-east Asia, including outsourcing some low-end manufacturing, to boost consumer demand."
• And finally, Xu Shanda, former head of China's federal tax bureau, has "called for the creation of a ($500bn) Chinese 'Marshall Plan' to lend money to Africa, Asia and Latin America to boost living standards in those regions and create demand for Chinese products to replace struggling US and European customers."

I find myself in agreement with Dyer's take on the idea:

If China can channel even a modest portion of its vast liquidity to the developing world in a responsible way that boosts demand without creating new, suffocating debt burden, it will be pushing on a door that is already opening.

Migrants as currency speculators?

One of the bright spots in the financial crisis so far has been the resilience of remittance flows to developing countries. While other forms of private finance fled developing countries when the international financial system came under stress, migrants kept sending money home. The latest Migration and Development Brief from the World Bank contains the relevant details: remittances to developing countries rose 15 percent between 2007 and 2008.

The curious question is why, considering that employment of migrants in many recipient countries has been hit hard. The Economist offers an explanation:

...returns do matter. For example, the combination of a weak rupee and higher interest rates in India compared with rich countries, may go a long way towards explaining last year’s vastly increased flow of remittances from Indians abroad.

The results are in for IFC

Although it may not be quite as stunning as the $3.4 billion in earnings that Goldman Sachs reported in the last quarter, the IFC has released its results for fiscal 2009, with the respectable result of $299 million of net income in a period of severe financial crisis. As part of its effort to help the poorest countries cope with the crisis, the IFC transferred $450 million to IDA, the concessional lending arm of the World Bank Group. Goldman had slightly different plans for its outsized profits—according to the Economist:

For the year to date Goldman has set aside $11.4 billion for compensation and benefits, more even than in the halcyon first half of 2007. Its ratio of pay to revenues continues to hover near the dizzying 50% level that was the norm on Wall Street before the meltdown.

The beef with Dambisa

A few months ago Dambisa Moyo came to the World Bank to present her new book, Dead Aid. I had a favorable impression from her talk, but quickly became aware of a host of criticisms of the book (see, for instance, Owen Barder or Dani Kaufmann). 

Now that I've had a chance to read the book myself, I appreciate what the critics are getting at. Their criticism focuses on the first half of the book, where Moyo argues not only that aid has not worked, but that it is really an obstacle to development. (I should be quick to add that she is talking about what she terms "systematic aid" and not humanitarian or charity-based aid.) I summarize the main criticisms of her argument here briefly:

1. Correlation does not equal causality: Moyo points out that "over the past thirty years, the most aid-dependent countries have exhibited growth rates averaging minus 0.2 per cent per annum." However, critics of the book rebut that just because much of Africa remains poor and has received lots of aid does not mean aid was the cause. Kevin Watkins puts it well: "Using her logic, you could argue that fire engines cause fires because you find them near burning houses."
   
2. It really does depend on the context: Moyo attacks the notion that aid works even in good policy environments. Kaufmann counters that "the reality is more complicated and less PR-sexy, I am afraid: ‘Aid Can Work’, yet it can also fail miserably, as it has done in many countries. The mediating factor for aid effectiveness is governance and corruption."
   
3. Cherrypicking: Moyo cites selective data points to support her arguments, e.g. the democracy agenda is oversold because Senegal has been growing slowly but Sudan has grown quickly. However, a more systematic approach to the data (e.g. Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?) reveals that democracy does have a positive effect on growth, even in low-income countries. (This particular example is my own, but others also make this general point.)  

The other dirty secret on the banks' balance sheets

On 28 May 2005, Denis Christel Sassou Nguesso, son of the president of Republic of Congo, went shopping in Paris. He spent €2,375 in Dolce & Gabbana, followed by €6,700 in Aubercy Bottier, a high-end bootmaker. Less than three weeks later, on 14 June, he was back: another €4,250 on shoes at Aubercy and €1,450 at a designer handbag shop. A month later, on 15 July, he burned another €2,000 at Aubercy, apparently his favourite shoe shop at the time.

According to a new report from the NGO Global Witness, Nguesso managed to pay for all of this using Congo's oil funds, along with some help from the Bank of East Asia and a front company in Anguilla. In Undue Diligence: How banks do business with corrupt regimes, Global Witness takes a close look at the dark underbelly of international finance, pointing fingers at giants like Barclays, HSBC, Citibank, and Deutsche Bank. All of these banks stand accused of helping venal politicians steal wealth from their citizens. Given that the idea of self-regulation of the financial industry is now in tatters, it is perhaps an opportune moment to push for greater transparency in the management of the natural resource wealth of the world's poorest countries.